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Abstract. For teaching about collaboration and conflicts with
regard to shared water resources, various types of games of-
fer valuable opportunities. Single-player computer games of-
ten give much power to the player and ignore the fact that
the best for some group might be difficult to achieve in re-
ality if the individuals have their own interests. Here we
present a new game called Irrigania, which aims at represent-
ing water conflicts among several actors in a simplified way.
While simple in its rules, this game illustrates several game-
theoretical situations typical for water-related conflicts. The
game has been implemented as a web-based computer game,
which allows easy application in classes. First classroom ap-
plications of the game indicated that, despite the simple rules,
interesting patterns can evolve when playing the game in a
class. These patterns can be used to discuss game theoretical
considerations related to water resource sharing.
1 Introduction
Sharing water resources often implies compromises be found
between different interests. Imparting an understanding of
such situations is an important part of educating profession-
als that have to work with issues related to water resource
collaboration and conflicts (Douven et al., 2012). Games can
be a suitable tool for teaching about these interest conflicts
between different water uses (Rusca et al., 2012) or raising
awareness on water sharing issues (Rajabu, 2007). Different
types of games are available for education. An example is
the World Water Game (Deltares, 2012), where the player
decides on different measures to avoid water shortages in the
various regions of the world. In another game, developed by
the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), the
player can take different water management actions for a city
and rural areas along a stream reach (FOEN, 2012). In some
computer games, an attempt is made to be as realistic as pos-
sible. This, however, can make the game complex and, thus,
less attractive and more difficult to understand (Jones, 2011).
One can also note that, even in complex games, not every-
thing is represented in a realistic way. An example is the
computer game SimCity, where urban hydrology is included,
but partly in an unrealistic way (Hellweger and D’Artista,
2007).
In all these games, as in many other similar computer
games, the player has the power to act as a monarch. In this
case, the issue is to find the right decisions for optimizing
the prosperity, defined in terms of wealth for the entire soci-
ety or system. In most real situations, such a single ruler is
obviously unrealistic as there are many different actors who
make decisions and each actor has his/her own interests. The
issue, therefore, is often not only to know what the best so-
lution for everyone on a long-term perspective would be, but
also how to realize this solution in a situation where the best
decision for a larger group might be different from the in-
terests of single actors. This is especially the case in tragedy
of common good (Hardin, 1968) situations, where a group
of self-interested individuals deplete a shared resource. Each
individual is acting rational, optimizing his/her own profit,
but ultimately this overuse will result in a situation that is not
beneficial to anyone on the long term.
Role-playing games are a type of game which allows for
interaction between different actors. The negotiation game
“Transboundary Waters Resolving Conflicts – Building Trust
Negotiation Simulation” developed by J. Kuylenstierna (per-
sonal communication, 2002) is an example of a role-playing
game. Here the players take on the roles of different actors
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in the negotiation of water-related issues between two coun-
tries. In this type of role-playing game, the players are not
restricted to a limited number of possible actions, which can
result in creative (but sometimes also unrealistic) solutions,
because actions are not evaluated in a quantitative way. Such
role-playing games can also be played online, which has
been found to be beneficial for student learning (Maier, 2007;
Varzaly and Baron, 2009).
Another type of role-playing game are games where play-
ers have limited decision options, and these decisions are
evaluated in some quantitative way, which in some of the
games is computer-based. Good examples are the games
“River Basin Game” and “Globalization of Water Manage-
ment” (Hoekstra, this issue), which are designed to demon-
strate issues related to sharing a common resource in an
up- and downstream setting, incorporating the concepts of
water footprint and virtual water trade. These games are
played in a board game-like setting and the players are lim-
ited to a certain number of actions, which are then quanti-
tatively evaluated using a computer. The Irrigation Manage-
ment Game (Burton, 1989, 1994) and another game called
River Basin Game (Magombeyi et al., 2008) are other inter-
esting examples of water resource games where negotiations
between different players are central. The River Basin Game
revolves around a sloping board where the downstream flow
of water is represented by glass marbles, which may or may
not end up in different fields for irrigation.
Here we present a new web-based game called Irrigania,
which aims at representing water conflicts among farmers in
a simplified way. While simple in its rules, this game illus-
trates several game-theoretical situations typical for water-
related conflicts.
2 Background on game theory
Game theory is the mathematical analysis or modeling of the
interaction between players, where the amount of payoff that
a player receives is dependent on the player’s own decision,
as well as the decisions of the other players. Madani (2010)
recently reviewed the applicability of game theory to water
resource issues and concludes that game theory can help un-
derstand and resolve water conflicts. Game theory can help
to comprehend the use, or often misuse, of public goods or
the hindrance for cooperation. An example of an interesting
theoretical illustration in this regard is the “Public Good Ex-
periment” game. In a group of 4 participants, everybody gets
$5. The participants can choose to invest (part of) the money
for the group. The total amount of invested money will be
doubled and shared among the 4 participants. Since a partic-
ipant only gets back half of the amount he/she invested him-
self/herself, the optimal strategy for each of the participants
is to “free ride” on the others, i.e., to invest nothing. However,
the whole group would be better off if each participant would
invest all his/her money (in that case each participant would
receive $10, the Pareto optimal solution) (Ledyard, 1995).
A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies chosen by each
of the individual players, with the characteristic that none of
the players can increase his/her payoff by changing strategy
when all other players keep their strategy fixed (Nash, 1951).
In the Public Good Experiment, for example, a player can
increase his/her payoff by investing less money for the group
(assuming that all other players are keeping their investment
fixed). Once a player invests nothing for the group, no further
improvement can be accomplished. Thus, the situation where
all players invest nothing for the group is a Nash equilibrium.
However, studies have shown that people do not always
behave as would be expected from pure analytical game the-
ory (Kahneman et al., 1986). A good example is the ulti-
matum version of “A piece of the pie”. One player gets an
amount of money (x). He or she then offers part of it (y) to
the other player. The other player can accept or reject the of-
fer. If (s)he accepts, (s)he will receive y, whereas the player
who made the offer earns x–y. If (s)he rejects, both players
earn nothing. The optimal strategy for the receiver is to ac-
cept whatever amount (s)he gets offered. Therefore, the op-
timal strategy for the first player would be to offer the min-
imum amount that is possible. However, studies have shown
that the receiver does not always play the optimal strategy,
but sometimes rejects an offer (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996;
List and Cherry, 2000) to punish the other player for not of-
fering a “fair” amount of money (Kahneman et al., 1986). As
with many water-related issues, actors might behave differ-
ently than the optimal strategy, and behavioral game theory
might provide a better explanation than pure analytical game
theory.
A game can be repeated several times. In a repeated game,
players might adapt their strategy based on the decisions of
the other players in previous rounds (Camerer, 2003) as well
as take into account how their strategy will affect the future
decisions of other players (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
A player might take into account how his/her strategy could
change his/her reputation. If his/her behavior is seen by the
other players as selfish, they might punish him/her, possibly
resulting in a bigger loss than the short-term profit.
A distinction can be made between non-cooperative
games, where players cannot make any agreements, and co-
operative games, where players can make (binding) agree-
ments about the strategies they will use. Furthermore, games
can be of complete or incomplete information. In a game of
complete information, all players know exactly the payoff
that each of the players will receive for all possible strategies
till the end of the game. In a game of incomplete information,
at least one of the players does not know all the payoffs.
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3 Description of the game
3.1 Game idea
Irrigania is a web-based game on the shared used of limited
water resources. The idea behind the game is that there are
different villages with a number of farmers in each of them.
The goal for each farmer is to generate the largest net in-
come. This, however, requires a certain amount of cooper-
ation within the village. Each player represents one farmer
in one village and has 10 fields for which he/she can de-
cide how to use them each year. There are three options:
rainfed agriculture, irrigation using river water, and irriga-
tion using groundwater. Different costs and revenues are as-
sociated with the different types of fields (Table 1) depend-
ing on a number of variables (see Table 2 for a parameter
list). While largely simplified, these costs and revenues re-
flect some aspects of reality. Rainfed agriculture has the low-
est costs, but also less revenue than the other options. With
irrigation, more can be produced both in terms of quantity
and quality, which is reflected by higher revenues, but also
by higher costs. In the case of river water irrigation, the cost
is fixed, but the income can be reduced if the river water has
to be distributed among too many fields in a village. In the
case of groundwater-based irrigation, the revenue is fixed,
but the costs increase if the depth to groundwater increases.
The reduction factor k for revenue from river water-
irrigated fields due to overuse of the river water is calculated
based on the precipitation conditions and the number of river
water-irrigated fields (Eq. 1, Table 1). This implies that, in a
normal year, the revenue is reduced if there are on average
more than 2.5 fields per farmer irrigated by river water. The
reduction is linear, which means that the revenue will drop
at a constant rate if there are too many river water-irrigated
fields. Both for an individual farmer and also for the village
as a whole, it is beneficial to use somewhat more than the
2.5 (for a normal year) fields for river water irrigation, as the
drop in revenue per field is compensated by the increased
number of fields. Assuming a village with five farmers and
only the two alternatives, rainfed and river water irrigation
for simplicity, the optimum number of fields irrigated with
river water is slightly above 3 with respect to the whole vil-
lage, whereas it is higher than this village-optimum value for
an individual farmer as long as the average number of river-
irrigated fields in the entire village does not exceed 5 (Fig. 1).
k = min
[
1,1− Friver/n− (1.5+P)
10− (1.5+P)
]
(1)
The groundwater level g in year t , expressed as depth to
groundwater, is updated based on precipitation conditions
and the number of groundwater-irrigated fields (Eq. 2).
gt = max
[
0,gt−1 −P − 0.5+Fgw/n
]
(2)
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Figure 1. Example to demonstrate the ‘tragedy of the common’ in Irrigania. Here a village with five 
famers and a normal precipitation year is assumed. Only two options, rainfed or river water irrigation, 
are considered for the ten fields. The black line shows the average income of the entire village per 
farmer as a function of the average number of river-irrigated fields and has a maximum value for an 
average of 3.4. The dashed lines show the income of one individual farmer as a function of the number 
of river-irrigated fields for different averages of river-irrigated fields for the other four farmers in the 
village, ranging from 3 for the upper line to 6 for the lowest line, with maximum values at 10 fields 
(for average field number of 3, upper line), 9 (for 4), 7 (for 5) and 5 (for 6, lowest line). The 
intersection of the black line with the dashed lines is the income an individual farmer would have if 
she/he would use just as many fields as the village average; if the dashed lines is increasing to the right 
of the intersection point this means that it is beneficial for an individual farmer to increase the number 
of river-irrigated fields by one or more.   
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Fig. 1. Example to demonstrate the “tragedy of the common” in Ir-
rigania. Here a village with five far ers and a normal precipitation
year is assumed. Only two options, rainfed or river water irrigation,
are considered for the ten fields. The black line shows the average
income of the entire village per farm r as a function of the average
number of river-irrigated fields and has a maximum value f r an
average of 3.4. The dashed lines show the income of one individ-
ual armer as a function of th number of river-irrigated fields for
different averages of river-irrig ted field for the other fo r rmers
in t village, ranging from 3 for the upper l ne to 6 for the lowest
line, with maximum value at 10 fields (for average field numb r
of 3, upper line), 9 (f r 4), 7 (for 5) and 5 (for 6, lowest line). The
intersection of the black line with the dashed line is the income an
individual farmer would have if he/she would use just as many fields
as the village average; if the dashed lines is increasing to the right
of the intersection point, this means that it is beneficial for an indi-
vidual farmer to increase the number of river-irrigated fields by one
or more.
This equation implies that under normal precipitation con-
ditions groundwater levels will drop if there are on average
more than 1.5 fields per farmer with groundwater irrigation.
From Eqs. (1) and (2), it follows that the maximum number
of fields, which can be irrigated without any revenue reduc-
tion, is scaled according to the number of farmers per village,
n. For both types of irrigation, dry or wet precipitation con-
ditions imply that one field more or less, respectively, can
be irrigated without adverse effects. While any overuse of
river water has an immediate effect, the effects for groundwa-
ter are rather visible over a longer perspective. On the other
hand, for river water there is no memory effect as there is for
groundwater.
Since overuse of resources could lower the payoff drasti-
cally, and the groundwater level might take several years to
recover, some cooperation within the village and willingness
to not overuse the resources is necessary to be able to win the
game. However, in order to win, a farmer needs to do better
than the other farmers within the village. Therefore, a farmer
needs to find the subtle balance between supporting the vil-
lage in not overusing the resources, while using a bit more
than the other farmers within his/her village. In other words,
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Table 1. Costs and revenues for fields with different water supply. For variable explanations, see Table 2.
Type of water supply for field Cost per field Revenue per field
Rainfed 5 30 (in normal year) 10 (in dry year) 40 (in wet year)
Irrigation with river water 20 100 k with k = min [1,1− Friver/n−(1.5+P)10−(1.5+P) ]
Irrigation with groundwater g< 8 : 20 g≥ 8 : 20 + (g–8)2 100
Table 2. Explanation of variables.
Variable Explanation
Friver Number of fields with river water irrigation
Fgw Number of fields with groundwater irrigation
g Depth to groundwater
n Number of farmers in a village
P Precipitation indicator (normal year: 1; dry
year: 0; wet year: 2)
winning farmers have to find a cunning compromise between
cooperation and competition within the village.
It should be noted that in the game it is assumed that there
is no direct interaction between the villages in terms of water
resources. The interesting effect of having several villages is
that in order to win the game a farmer has not only to be best
in his/her village, but at the same time needs to cooperate
with the other farmers in his/her village in order to do better
than the farmers in other villages. In that way, there is a com-
petition between the different villages to use the resources as
efficiently and sustainably as possible.
3.2 Software implementation
Irrigania has been implemented as a web application that is
built in Visual Basic ASP.NET 4.0 and is running under IIS
6.0. User authentication is used to give users access to their
personal pages. Two different types of users can be distin-
guished: teachers and students. Based on their type, users
can either enter the teacher pages or the student pages. Irriga-
nia includes two Microsoft SQL Server 2005 databases. The
ASPNETDB database is used by ASP.NET to store mem-
bership data. The Irrigation game database contains teacher,
game, village and farmer settings and status. HTML Help
files are available, providing the user with information about
the functionality of the game and the user interface.
Teachers need to register before they can use Irrigania,
for which a password is needed that can be requested from
the authors. After registration, a teacher can log in to his/her
personal pages. Teachers can set up one or more games by
specifying the villages and corresponding farmers within that
game (Fig. 2). Teachers can define the length of a game, the
precipitation conditions, and decide if farmers can see each
other’s input values. Furthermore, teachers can follow the
status of a game while students are playing. In an overview,
the current year, status of the villages (groundwater level and
average number of fields irrigated by river water) and farmer
status (water supply input values and (accumulated) balance)
are given.
Players (e.g., students) obtain login details from their
teacher. After logging in, students are redirected to the game
page, where the decision on how to use the fields can be
entered (Fig. 3). Each year, a farmer (or the player) has to
submit values on how to supply his/her 10 fields with water.
When all farmers have submitted their values, computations
are carried out on the server, after which the game contin-
ues with the next year. During the game, farmers can see
their (accumulated) balance, the current hydrological condi-
tions, and last year’s input values of the other farmers (op-
tional). Once the game has finished, farmers can go to the
results page to watch the game results. Results are published
per farmer as well as per village.
3.3 Irrigania in teaching
In a class, it is useful to play several rounds of Irrigania,
especially because the game can be played in different set-
tings. Usually Irrigania will be played in a computer class
room. Technically, Irrigania can also of course be played
with students sitting at a distance from each other, although
this requires some possibility for communication among the
students. In versions where the students know who belongs
to which village, students are allowed to talk to each other.
These discussions are an important part of Irrigania. Hav-
ing different villages allows the game to be played with any
number of players. We found a number of 4–6 farmers in
each village to generate the most interesting discussions.
Here we provide a recommended series of Irrigania games
in class (about 3 h) consisting of several games with different
settings (each game is played over about 15 rounds/years):
1. Normal years, no information provided on the sustain-
able number of fields for the two irrigation types; stu-
dents know who is who and see the decisions of the oth-
ers after each year:
– Cooperative
– Incomplete information
– Students do not know the cost and profit system yet.
They can develop their strategy by experimenting.
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Figure 2. Screenshot of the teacher interface when setting up a game 
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the teacher interface when setting up a game.
2. As 1, but information is provided (i.e., Eqs. 1–2):
– Cooperative
– Complete information
– Game has changed from incomplete to complete in-
formation. Students can confirm their strategy and
further improve their strategy based on the equa-
tions.
3. As 2, but students do not know who the other farmers in
their village are (practically, it is most efficient to ran-
domly assign the students to different villages in this
case):
– Non-cooperative
– Complete information
– Game has changed from cooperative to non-
cooperative. This may lead to more selfish behav-
ior (Hoffman et al., 1996b). A player might try to
act more selfishly to benefit, at least more than the
others, from over-using the resources.
4. As 2 or 3, but with randomly varying years (dry-normal-
wet):
– Cooperative/Non-cooperative
– Incomplete information
– The game has changed to a game with incomplete
information again (being played either cooperative
or non-cooperative). Although students of course
still know Eqs. (1–2), information about the yearly
rainfall conditions is missing this time, making the
game harder, but more realistic.
5. As any of the above, but students do not see the deci-
sions of the others:
– Cooperative/Non-cooperative
– Complete/Incomplete information
– This option gives the players a certain amount
of anonymity. Especially the cooperative version
might be interesting. Trust becomes important: are
farmers playing according to how they agreed to
play, or will some players betray the others?
4 Discussion
During first tests in class, several interesting patterns could
be observed. In cooperating villages, where farmers agreed to
not overuse resources, farmers did best on average, but sin-
gle “selfish” farmers could still win. The game is designed
in such a way that the profit quickly decreases if water re-
sources are overused and, thus, it is important for the farm-
ers of a village, that the maximum number of fields that can
be sustainably irrigated by groundwater or river water, is not
exceeded. A selfish farmer might be hoping that the other
farmers are taking care of restoring the water level. However,
during class it was observed that, if one farmer behaves too
selfishly and reproachful and words did not help, the others
started to punish him/her by deliberately overusing the water
resources, and the income of the entire village decreased sig-
nificantly. They did this, knowing that they would also punish
themselves, just to make sure that the selfish farmer did not
win the game (in comparison to farmers from other villages).
Such a behavior is not rational from a perspective of maxi-
mizing individual profits, but can be explained from a fair-
ness viewpoint (see “a piece of the pie” in the above section
on background in game theory). If several rounds of Irriga-
nia are played (i.e., if Irrigania is played as a repeated game),
punishment of selfish farmers might show that being selfish
could result in lower payoff, and therefore makes this strat-
egy less attractive in next rounds.
When the students did not know who the other farmers in
their village were, the lack of social control leads to more
overuse of the water and thus less income on average. This
agrees with the common observation that social isolation
leads to more individualistic behavior and less cooperation
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Figure 3. Screenshot of the student interface when playing the Irrigania game 
 
Fig. 3. Screenshot of the student interface when playing the Irrigania game.
(Nowak and Highfield, 2011). Hoffman et al. (1996) showed
that, during the dictator game, higher social isolation re-
sults in more selfish behavior, and Bohnet and Frey (1999)
showed that solidarity increases with decreasing social dis-
tance. However, information about the farming decisions of
the other players in previous rounds might still be of help by
giving a farmer some insight into the strategies of the other
players. Therefore, it might be expected that there could be
even more overuse of water in the case where the students
cannot see the decisions of the others.
Another observation was that good decisions are more dif-
ficult with randomly varying rainfall conditions. The option
to use randomly varying rainfall conditions changes the game
into a game with incomplete information. For each of the
three rainfall conditions, there is a separate payoff matrix.
The user does not know which payoff matrix corresponds
to each round, and therefore playing an optimal strategy be-
comes more difficult. Some players might be willing to take
higher risks, whereas others might tend towards more con-
servative decisions.
In general, the aim of the game is to be the best farmer, i.e.,
make the most profit. For pedagogical reasons, however, it is
recommended to not emphasize this too much. Some groups
also defined other goals such as being the best village or hav-
ing the winning farmer within their village. In one case, a
group also decided to do all they could to “punish” a farmer
who was accused of acting selfishly and ignored agreements.
All the above observations can be related to general pat-
terns of real-world conflicts. The game provides an illustra-
tion of a tragedy-of-the-commons situation related to water
management. In the short term, it can be profitable to overuse
resources, especially if only a few players do so. In the long
run, however, overuse leads to decreased profits for every-
one. The game also demonstrates a difference between the
use of water from a river and from groundwater. While water
shortages might happen more quickly for river water, there is
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no year to year memory. For groundwater, on the other hand,
overuse might not cause shortages directly, but once short-
ages become notable, it takes longer before the groundwater
levels are back to normal.
Studies have shown that people only look a limited num-
ber of steps forward (iterated rationality) (Nagel, 1995).
This might, to some degree, also apply for students playing
Irrigania. Players might look only a few years in the fu-
ture, ignoring the long-term effect of a lower groundwater
level. It can be argued that this effect is even larger in reality,
where objectives other than those considered in Irrigania are
of importance, such as political uncertainties or varying rev-
enues due to changing market prices. There is also a differ-
ence between the non-cooperative and the cooperative ver-
sion, i.e., cooperation might influence the awareness of the
students about the groundwater level and the willingness to
keep the groundwater level stable compared to the case of no
cooperation where the strategy might rather be to secure at
least short-term profits.
All games simplify reality to a certain degree, and the real
situation or conflict is reduced both in terms of considered
state variables and possible handling actions in order to make
the situation (or game rules) easier to understand for the play-
ers. With Irrigania, we chose a larger reduction than in most
other games. The aim is that the players should fully under-
stand the rules and their effect and make informed decisions.
It is interesting that, even with such simplifications, inter-
esting patterns can evolve when playing the game. On the
other hand, there are of course important aspects of water
resource sharing that are not represented in Irrigania. These
include the upstream-downstream asymmetry (Janssen et al.,
2011), the linkage between groundwater and river, and the
conjunctive use of these resources (Kazmi et al., 2012). The
latter could be considered by introducing an initial cost to be
able to use groundwater or groundwater from below a certain
depth. The upstream-downstream asymmetry is an important
aspect in many water resource issues. It could be interesting
to consider this both between and within villages. To keep
the game interesting, the power of being upstream has to be
balanced by some downstream power (as often found in real-
world conflicts), which quickly makes the game much more
complex. The interesting aspect of Irrigania is its simplicity,
equal initial conditions for each player, and the conflict be-
tween competition and cooperation within a village. The fact
that rules and conditions are equal for all farmers might not
be realistic, but allows focus on the dynamics of sharing a
common resource without the complication of different ini-
tial conditions. The interesting aspect is that, although con-
ditions are identical, results, when playing the game, have
shown large differences between farmers and villages. Also,
identical conditions make it easier for the students to experi-
ence the theoretical aspects of Irrigania. In courses, it can be
beneficial to compare this to games with uneven conditions,
like the Irrigation Management Game (Burton, 1989, 1994),
to experience the effect of inequalities.
5 Concluding remarks
Games related to water resource collaboration and conflicts
are a valuable tool for making students and (future) profes-
sionals aware of the issues related to sharing common wa-
ter resources. This is especially valuable in situations with
changing conditions, where the task is to deal with new and
previously not experienced situations. Predictions for the fu-
ture point towards increased water scarcity, which will in-
crease the need for cooperation in water resource manage-
ment.
Irrigania is a very simple game with only few options
for decisions. Still, interesting patterns evolve when playing
the game in class. Similar to the games presented by Hoek-
stra (2012) and Rusca et al. (2012), Irrigania can be used as
an additional element in courses related to water manage-
ment conflicts and collaboration. While the game obviously
is a vast simplification of reality, it will nevertheless help
to teach about real-world water resources challenges. Differ-
ences to real-world problems, like the upstream-downstream
asymmetry that is not represented in the game, can (and
should) be discussed in class after playing the game. After
playing the game, the students will have experienced a water-
related example of the tragedy of the commons. They will
furthermore have understood the difference between stream
water resources and groundwater resources in their response
to overuse and their potential recovery. They will also have
seen that uncertainty about the coming weather conditions
complicates optimal water resource planning. With these
learning goals, the game Irrigania is a valuable complement
to other course elements when teaching water resource con-
flicts and collaborations.
Acknowledgements. We thank our students for participating in
testing the game and the reviewers Maurits Ertsen and Arjen Hoek-
stra for their helpful comments. As a response to one comment by
Maurits Ertsen, we reanalyzed the effects of the equation defining
the revenue of river-irrigated fields and realized that our original
formulation could be improved. We also thank Tracy Ewen for
valuable comments to improve the English.
Edited by: T. Wagener
References
Bohnet, I. and Frey, B. S.: The sound of silence in prisoner’s
dilemma and dictator games, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 38, 43–57,
1999.
Burton, M. A.: Experiences with the irrigation management game,
Irrigation and drainage systems, Irrigation and drainage system,
3, 217–228, 1989.
Burton, M. A.: The irrigation management game: a role playing
exercise for training in irrigation management, Irrigation and
drainage systems, 7, 305–318, 1994.
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/16/2523/2012/ Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 16, 2523–2530, 2012
2530 J. Seibert and M. J. P. Vis: Irrigania – a web-based game about sharing water resources
Camerer, C.: Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic
interaction, Princeton University Press, Princeton, xv, 550 pp.,
2003.
Deltares: World Water Game, http://www.wldelft.nl/soft/wwg/,
(last access: 28 June 2012), 2012.
Douven, W., Mul, M. L., ´Alvarez, B. F., Son, L. H., Bakker, N.,
Radosevich, G., and van der Zaag, P.: Enhancing capacities of
riparian professionals to address and resolve transboundary is-
sues in international river basins: experiences from the Lower
Mekong River Basin, Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., 9, 3813–
3849, doi:10.5194/hessd-9-3813-2012, 2012.
FOEN: Der Umgang mit Wasser – mehr als ein Spiel, http://
www.bafu.admin.ch/wassernutzung/07805/, (last access: 28 June
2012), 2012.
Hardin, G.: Tragedy of Commons, Science, 162, 1243–1248, 1968.
Hellweger, F. L. and D’Artista, B. R.: Urban hydrology in a
computer game?, Environ. Modell. Softw., 22, 1679–1684,
doi:10.1016/j.envost.2006.09.004, 2007.
Hoekstra, A. Y.: Computer-supported games and role plays in teach-
ing water management, Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., in review, 2012.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., and Smith, V. L.: On expectations and
the monetary stakes in ultimatum games, Int. J. Game Theory, 25,
289–301, 1996.
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., and Cardenas, J. C.: Head-enders
as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irriga-
tion experiments in the laboratory and the field, Ecol. Econ., 70,
1590–1598, 2011.
Jones, N.: Video game: Playing with the planet, Nature Clim.
Change, 1, 17–18, 2011.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H.: Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, J. Bus., 59, S285–S300, 1986.
Kazmi, S. I., Ertsen, M. W., and Asib, M. R.: The impact of con-
junctive use of canal and tube well water in Lagar irrigated area,
Pakistan, Phys. Chem. Earth, doi:10.1016/j.pce.2012.01.001, in
press, 2012.
Ledyard, J. O.: Public goods: a survey of experimental research, in:
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by: Kagel, J.
H. and Roth, A. E., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 111–
251, 1995.
List, J. A. and Cherry, T. L.: Learning to accept in ultimatum games:
Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers,
Exp. Econ., 3, 11–29, 2000.
Madani, K.: Game theory and water resources, J. Hydrol., 381, 225–
238, doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2009.11.045, 2010.
Magombeyi, M. S., Rollin, D., and Lankford, B.: The river basin
game as a tool for collective water management at community
level in South Africa, Phys. Chem. Earth, 33, 873–880, 2008.
Maier, H. R.: Meeting the challenges of engineering education via
online roleplay simulations, Eng. Education, 13, 31–39, 2007.
Nagel, R.: Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study,
Am. Econ. Rev., 85, 1313–1326, 1995.
Nash, J.: Non-Cooperative Games, Ann. Math., 54, 286–295, 1951.
Nowak, M. A. and Highfield, R.: SuperCooperators: altruism, evo-
lution, and why we need each other to succeed, 1st Free Press
hardcover ed., Free Press, New York, xix, 330 pp., 2011.
Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A.: A course in game theory, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass., xv, 352 pp., 1994.
Rajabu, K. R. M.: Use and impacts of the river basin game in
implementing integrated water resources management in Mkoji
sub-catchment in Tanzania, Agr. Water Manage., 94, 63–72,
doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2007.08.010, 2007.
Rusca, M., Heun, J., and Schwartz, K.: Water management simu-
lation games and the construction of knowledge, Hydrol. Earth
Syst. Sci. Discuss., 9, 3063–3085, doi:10.5194/hessd-9-3063-
2012, 2012.
Varzaly, J. A. and Baron, J. A.: Innovating corporate governance
teaching through online scenario-based learning, Internat. Rev.
Business Res. Papers, 5, 156–159, 2009.
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 16, 2523–2530, 2012 www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/16/2523/2012/
